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For fifteen years and four editions, our casebook1 has dif-
fered from the mainstream canon2 in two respects. First, we give 
relatively greater emphasis to the structure of government issues 
of federalism and separation of powers. Constitutional law 
casebooks and courses typically include an examination of judi-
cial review, distribution of power among federal branches and 
between the federal and the state governments, and individual 
rights. The second of these themes, however, is often short-
changed in favor of the study of the first and third. Structural is-
sues have played, and continue to play, an important role in con-
stitutional law and in society generally. Moreover, concerns 
about distribution of governmental power may influence indi-
vidual rights determinations.3 
To facilitate this allocation of the subject areas, we divided 
our basic constitutional law offering into two required courses, 
each three credits. Constitutional Law I begins with an examina-
tion of judicial review but then focuses exclusively on federalism 
and separation of powers. The separate Constitutional Law II 
course, taught in the Fall semester of the second year, examines 
individual rights issues. 
• Dean and Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law. 
•• Laura J. and L. Douglas Meredith Professor, Syracuse University College of 
Law. 
1. Daan Braveman, William C. Banks, and Rodney A. Smolla, Constitutional Law: 
Structure and Rights in Our Federal System (4th ed. 2000). 
2. We use the term to refer to the teaching canon, the material used to educate law 
students. See J.M. Balkin and Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 
Harv. L. Rev. %3,970 (1998). 
3. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 
(1973). 
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We also depart from the traditional approach to constitu-
tional law by attempting to integrate constitutional theory and 
doctrine with practical problems. During the past decade, con-
siderable attention has focused on methods of integrating theory 
and practice into the study of law.4 While much of this literature 
focused on clinical legal education, some suggested the values of 
greater integration in traditional classrooms as well.5 From the 
beginning of our collaboration, we agreed that students under-
stand constitutional law theory better after they see its applica-
tion, and that the practical implications are more fully appreci-
ated when the development of constitutional law theory is 
learned. We prepared a set of problems for nearly every section 
of each chapter, and we use the problems to emphasize the prac-
tical component of constitutional law in most class sessions. The 
problems provide opportunities to escape the "pigeonholing"6 
effect of legal education, allowing students to see relationships 
among topics covered in their other courses. In some instances, 
the practical problems also allow the use of interdisciplinary ma-
terial. Finally, the problems expose students to professional 
lawyering skills and issues of professionalism. 
As our book and teaching evolved, we devoted considerably 
more time and book space (in relative terms) to separation of 
powers and federalism. We resisted reprinting most secondary 
source materials, and we presented only bare bones notes and 
questions following full case edits. We use our book, supple-
mentary materials, and the classroom to integrate course topics 
whenever possible, to illustrate the role of social science disci-
plines in solving constitutional law problems, to show how state 
constitutional law relates to and complements federal law, and to 
bring some current constitutional law issues to the students' at-
tention. The following discussion uses three examples to illus-
trate our use of practical problems to teach the structural issues. 
4. See, e.g., Hugh Brayne, Nigel Duncan, and Richard Grimes, Clinical Legal 
Education: Active Learning in Your LAw School (1998); J.P. Ogilvy, Leah Wortham, and 
Lisa Lerman, Learning From Practice (1998); Symposium, Theoretics of Practice: The 
Integration of Progressive Thought and Action, 43 Hastings L.J. 717 (1992); Phyllis G?ld-
farb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical Education, 15 Minn. 
L. Rev. 1599 (1971). 
5. See, e.g., Richard Boldt and Marc Feldman, The Faces of LAw in Theory and 
Practice: Doctrine, Rhetoric, and Social Context, 43 Hastings L.J. 1111 (1992). 
6. The "pigeonholing" practice attempts to place issues in single boxes and, in so 
doing, impedes development of an understanding of the complexities of the subject. As 
Laurence Tribe observed, pigeonholing "endangers the pigeon." Laurence Tribe, 
American Constitutional LAw 943 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1988). 
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TEACHING FEDERALISM THROUGH THE 11TH 
AMENDMENT 
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We begin the federalism section with a consideration of the 
reasons for a federalist structure and a historical overview. Spe-
cifically, our book includes historical material about the Consti-
tutional Convention and the ratification debates. It then pres-
ents textual material that briefly traces the federalism theme in 
the pre-Civil War period, in the period from the Civil War to the 
New Deal, and in the modern period. 
Like most casebooks, we examine federalism limits on the 
elected branches and the states. In this chapter, we first study 
the scope of federal power and then explore congressional 
power to regulate interstate commerce. The final section in-
cludes the dormant commerce clause cases as a vehicle for 
studying constitutional limits on the states' power to regulate 
commerce. For the most part, this chapter is typical of most 
other books and includes much of the "canon." 
The problem in this chapter places the students in the role 
of legislators who are considering whether Congress has the 
power to enact a bill that requires all public and private employ-
ers of 15 or more employees to provide a certain level of health 
insurance coverage. The problem reappears as we progress 
through the material. When the students first consider the 
problem after reading McCulloch they have difficulty finding a 
source of power, even with the Court's conclusions about the 
Necessary and Proper Clause. We then begin the commerce 
clause material and discuss the problem after reading Gibbons,7 
Knight,8 and Hammer.9 When they study the post-New Deal 
cases/0 they begin to see the potential for relying on the com-
merce clause to enact the bill. Finally, we examine the more re-
cent cases11 and consider their impact on congressional power. 
The problem enables students to understand the development of 
the commerce clause theory and doctrine over time. It also pro-
vides an opportunity to discuss underlying federalism values and 
whether congressional regulation in this area threatens those 
7. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
8. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
9. Hammer v. Dagenhan, 247 U.S. 25 (1918). 
10. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 
294 (1964). 
11. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985); New 
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
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values. Finally, the students must examine the legislator's duty 
to consider constitutional issues and the differences between the 
legislative and judicial processes. In that regard, the problem is 
a bridge to the Public Law Processes course (a required first year 
course focusing on lawmaking by legislative and administrative 
bodies). We ask students to build the kind of legislative record 
that might be needed to support the legislation. We compare the 
process for developing that record with the judicial process. We 
also discuss the legislator's ability to balance political considera-
tions with the duty to uphold the constitution. 
Our most significant departure from the canon is the chap-
ter on "Federalism Limits on Federal Courts." Here, we include 
material that is taught more commonly in Federal Courts 
courses. We cover the Eleventh Amendment/2 abstention,13 
remedies,14 and Supreme Court review.15 We have found that 
this material provides a richer opportunity than the commerce 
clause to examine the constitutional structuring of state-federal 
relations, the role of the courts in weighing federalism concerns, 
and the underlying federalism values. 
Once again, we use a problem throughout the chapter as a 
vehicle for focusing the study. Last year, the problem was a 
variation of a case pending in Rochester, New York, which 
challenges the state's method of allocating funds to public 
schools. We review the complaint and the factual allegations 
supporting the claim that New York State is denying a minimally 
adequate education to children in the Rochester school district. 
The plaintiffs allege that the state is violating the state and fed-
eral constitutions as well as Title VI. They are seeking injunctive 
relief directing the State to develop a plan to remedy the effects 
of the past disparities and to ensure that Rochester school chil-
dren will be provided an adequate education in the future. 
At the outset (before we discuss any of the material), we 
consider where the parties might prefer to litigate the case, state 
or federal court. It is an opportunity to review material that is 
usually pigeonholed in the Civil Procedure course. For example, 
12 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halder-
man, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 511 U.S. 44 (1996); Alden 
v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999). 
13. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Louisiana 
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959). 
14. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 
(1987). 
15. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
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we discuss subject matter jurisdiction, including issues relating to 
federal question jurisdiction, concurrent jurisdiction, and sup-
plemental jurisdiction. We also examine other factors that affect 
the forum selection decision. Such an examination leads to a 
discussion of the relative willingness and competence of state 
and federal courts to consider the issues raised in the complaint. 
We then study the Eleventh Amendment as a limit on the 
power of the federal courts. As in the commerce clause area, we 
use the problem to illustrate the development of the doctrine 
over time, the underlying federalism issues, and the practical ap-
plication. Beginning with the language of the Amendment, we 
consider whether plaintiffs in the Rochester case would be 
barred from federal court. Next, we discuss the effect of Hans16 
on the forum selection decision and try to reconcile that case 
with the Amendment's language. Young11 and Edelman18 allow 
the students to explore the possibilities of avoiding the impact of 
Hans, depending on the relief requested. Seminole/9 reveals fur-
ther limits on Young that might have an impact on the ability of 
the Rochester plaintiffs to bring their case in the federal court. 
The problem also provides an opportunity to discuss waiver 
of the Eleventh Amendment immunity. After Seminole, we ex-
amine whether Title VI abrogates the state's immunity and 
whether Congress has the power to do so. This leads to a con-
sideration of the relative power under Article I and the Four-
teenth Amendment and why the federalism considerations might 
be different. Finally, when we next teach the material we will 
examine the impact of Alden and whether it prevents the suit 
against the state in any court. Alden is an excellent vehicle for 
exploring the federalism values at stake and whether the exer-
cise of jurisdiction in such cases disserves the purposes of our 
federal structure. 
Following the study of the Eleventh Amendment, we con-
sider the application of the abstention doctrine if the case were 
brought in federal court. Could the state successfully argue un-
der Pullman or Thibodaux that the federal court should abstain 
while the plaintiffs litigate their state constitutional claim in state 
court? Similarly, could the state invoke Younger-style absten-
tion, particularly after Pennzoil? 
16. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
17. Ex Pane Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
18. Eldelman v. Jordm!, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
19. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
366 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 17:361 
We end the study of this chapter by asking the students to 
decide where they would bring the Rochester case. This gives us 
a chance to summarize the doctrine and the theory of federalism 
and again address some practical considerations. For example, 
do the plaintiffs want to bring the case in federal court, taking 
many years and spending large resources to litigate the jurisdic-
tional and abstention issues (and not reaching the merits)? 
Would they recommend that the plaintiffs bring two cases, one 
in state court and the other in federal? In considering this later 
possibility we have an opportunity to discuss whether plaintiffs 
can afford two lawsuits and to incorporate Civil Procedure mate-
rial on claim and issue preclusion. We also discuss the question 
of who chooses the forum, the client or the lawyer, and the diffi-
culties in adequately counseling a client on the issues that might 
govern the decision. At the end of the discussion, we inform 
them that the case was actually filed in state court and hope they 
have an appreciation and understanding of the theoretical and 
practical considerations that might have justified the forum se-
lection. 
TEACHING SEPARATION OF POWERS THROUGH 
ARTICLE III 
Without a doubt, the constitutional law scholarship canon 
includes Article III and the justiciability doctrines. The case-
books generally present materials on standing, political question, 
and mootness/ripeness, at a minimum. Yet Article III has tradi-
tionally been at the fringes of the pedagogic canon, based on the 
belief that the students can learn the ideas in a Federal Courts 
course, or that time is short and the subject is abstract and not at 
the core of basic constitutional law. Too few students take the 
Federal Courts course (at least at our school) to justify omitting 
Article III in the basic Constitutional Law course. Article III is 
demonstrably at the core of constitutional law today,20 and we 
believe that many of its abstract ideas can be made more con-
crete if they are presented in a way that demonstrates the inter-
relationship of justiciability and decisions on the merits. The 
20. Apart from significant developments in the law of citizen and legislator standing 
in the 1990s, and the important political question decision in Nixon v. United States, 506 
U.S. 224 (1993), consider the buzz in constitutional law circles con~~ng the justiciabil-
ity of challenges to President Clinton's impeachment and the contmumg questwn of the 
reviewability of constitutional challenges to deportations pursuant to the 1996 amend-
ments to the Immigration and Naturalization Act. See generally Reno v. Arab-American 
Anti-Discrimination Committee, 119 S. 0. 936 (1999). 
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traditional teaching canon focuses largely on the Supreme Court, 
thereby contributing to the abstractness of the lessons. To re-
duce the abstract quality, we assign and discuss supplementary 
materials that illustrate how separation of powers law is made by 
the political branches in working through actual disputes over 
policy.21 By combining the teaching of justiciability and separa-
tion of powers through a war powers exercise, we find that stu-
dents learn a great deal about the theory and practice of separa-
tion of powers. The abstract becomes practical, and the practical 
lessons reinforce the theory. 
Our book's section on justiciability follows a section on the 
foreign relations and war powers, part of a larger chapter on 
separation of powers. At the end of the war powers material, a 
problem supplies portions of the complaint in the district court 
from Del/urns v. Bush,22 the most prominent of the judicial chal-
lenges to the Gulf War. The problem asks the students to take 
into account the foreign relations and war powers, including the 
War Powers Resolution, in framing an answer to the complaint 
on behalf of President Bush. In class, discussion ranges from the 
text of Articles I and II, to Y oungstown23 and the approaches to 
separation of powers found in the Youngstown Court's several 
opinions, to The Prize Cases,24 to the War Powers Resolution.25 
Mter some discussion of the merits arguments, it is appropriate 
to ask whether a district court judge would really enjoin the Gulf 
War. The transition to justiciability is thus made. 
We offer some narrative on Article III and on the separa-
tion of powers theory embedded in the justiciability doctrines. 
Instead of the usual Supreme Court fare on political question, 
standing, and ripeness, we present the principal Gulf War 
cases-Del/urns and Ange v. Bush. 26 This permits us to return to 
the war powers problem and to revisit the discussion on framing 
an answer and then arguing a motion to dismiss on behalf of the 
President. The decision in Del/urns may be viewed as "answer-
ing" the problem, but it is possible simply to present the ques-
tions on appeal of Judge Greene's decision. 
21. We assign and discuss frequently separation of powers and federalism materials 
presented in Louis Fisher and Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law 
(West, 2d ed. 1996). We find the notion that three branches make separation of powers 
law a useful antidote to the court-centeredness of the casebook. 
22. 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990). 
23. 343 u.s. 579 (1952). 
24. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
25. 50 u.s.c. §§ 1541-48 (1994). 
26. 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990). 
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The factual background of Dellums and Ange begins with 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August, 1990. President Bush 
then ordered the deployment of a force to protect against further 
Iraqi advances-Operation Desert Shield. By early November, 
approximately 230,000 United States armed forces were de-
ployed to Saudi Arabia and to the Persian Gulf. Then, on No-
vember 8, the President announced a significant increase in the 
military deployment in the Persian Gulf for the express purpose 
of providing the United States with an offensive force capable of 
forcing Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. On November 19, Rep-
resentative Ronald Dellums and 53 other Members of Congress 
sought a court order enjoining the President from offensive mili-
tary operations against Iraq unless he obtained an authorization 
from Congress pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the 
Constitution.Z7 
On December 13, Judge Greene denied the injunction and 
ruled that the lawsuit was not ripe for judicial resolution, for two 
reasons. First, a majority of Congress had not expressed a view.28 
Second, the executive branch had not demonstrated a sufficient 
commitment to the option of initiating war without congres-
sional authorization.29 He also rejected the Government's argu-
ments that the lawsuit should be dismissed for lack of standing of 
the congressional plaintiffs, or in exercise of the court's remedial 
discretion.30 Finally, Judge Greene ruled that the political ques-
tion doctrine did not bar the court from deciding the constitu-
tional merits question in an otherwise appropriate case: "[I]n 
principle, an injunction may issue at the request of Members of 
Congress to prevent the conduct of a war which is about to be 
carried on without congressional authorization .... "31 
Factually, Ange differs from Dellums only in that plaintiff 
Michael Ray Ange was a serviceman deployed to the Persian 
Gulf in Operation Desert Shield. His claims for relief also mir-
ror those in Dellums, except that Ange claimed in addition that 
the Operation Desert Shield deployment violated the War Pow-
ers Resolution. In Ange, Judge Lamberth ruled that the war 
powers questions presented were nonjusticiable political ques-
tions.32 Judge Lamberth also ruled that Sergeant Ange's lawsuit 
27. Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1143-44. 
28. ld. at 1149-51. 
29. ld. at 1151-52. 
30. ld. at 1147-49. 
31. ld. at 1149. 
32 Ange v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 509, 511-15 (D.D.C. 1990). 
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was not ripe, based on the "speculative" nature of the "threat" 
that the President would bypass Congress and launch an offen-
sive war.33 According to Judge Lamberth, his refusal to exercise 
jurisdiction simply leaves Congress with the option of declaring 
war, preventing the President from doing so through exercise of 
the appropriations power, or impeaching President Bush.34 
The political question doctrine's application to the problem 
may be addressed by asking why a federal judge would decide a 
dispute between members of Congress and the President. In 
Dellums, Judge Greene answered the Government's political 
questions argument by noting that leaving it to a "semantic deci-
sion by the Executive" to determine whether an offensive mili-
tary operation constitutes a "war" that the Congress must 
authorize "would evade the plain language of the Constitu-
tion. "35 While other cases might present a closer factual question 
and provide cause for deferring to the political branches to de-
cide whether an operation is a "war," the magnitude of forces 
poised for attack made this question easy to answer. Although 
there is ample authority for the proposition that it is for the 
President to conduct the nation's foreign relations,36 the courts 
routinely decide foreign relations cases.37 The differing ap-
proaches of Judges Greene and Lamberth to the political ques-
tion doctrine also allow consideration of the theoretical compo-
nents of the textual commitment and prudential bases for the 
doctrine, and for application of the theory to the facts of the 
Gulf War problem. Judge Greene noted that courts can and do 
answer the question of which political branch decides to take the 
nation to war,38 while Judge Lamberth found that the same deci-
sion was textually committed "not to one of the political 
branches, but to both."39 Judge Lamberth did not say why the 
Declaration and Commander in Chief clauses could not be in-
terpreted independently. Judge Greene chose not to invoke the 
prudential justifications for finding a political question, based on 
the stark magnitude of the forces aligned in the Gulf.40 Judge 
33. ld. at 515-17. 
34. ld. at 514. 
35. Del/urns, 752 F. Supp. at 1145. 
36. See generally, Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (1972). 
37. See, e.g., United States v. Cuniss-Wright Expon Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); 
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
38. Del/urns, 752 F. Supp. at 1146. See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 
668 (1863); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611,613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
39. Ange, 752 F. Supp. at 514. 
40. Del/urns, 752 F.Supp. at 1146. 
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Lamberth, on the other hand, relied on the lack of standards and 
lack of expertise rationales from Baker v. Carr.41 
The fact that the Supreme Court rarely invokes the political 
question doctrine is itself a subject for discussion, and the long 
odds against Supreme Court review may be tied to discussion of 
what strategy to take in representing Dellums or the President in 
the problem. Our note treatment of Nixon v. U.S. 42 also illus-
trates that the Court may muddy the theory of political questions 
by finding textual commitment and prudential bars to reviewing 
whether the "sole power" impeachment language bars the Sen-
ate from delegating to a committee the function of gathering 
evidence and hearing testimony. 
Next, the standing to sue issues may be introduced by ask-
ing why the federal courts insist on anything more than a will-
ingness to litigate and ability to pay the filing fees in order to 
bring a lawsuit. The separation of powers content of Dellums 
and Ange on standing to sue flows easily from discussion of the 
problem. In general, it is easy to see that relaxation of standing 
rules expands judicial power. But is such a tendency realistically 
to be feared in the war powers context? Are standing rules the 
most appropriate device for limiting judicial power? Does the 
law of standing serve interests that are not met by the political 
question doctrine? 
The discussions about legislators as plaintiffs might begin by 
asking students to identify the capacities in which a legislator 
may sue. Suits on behalf of constituents are a classic form of 
third-party standing and generally present only a generalized 
grievance. Suits to vindicate a personal or institutional interest 
in legislative prerogatives are more typical. After the Court's 
decision in Raines v. Byr~3 in 1997, such suits are also now quite 
difficult to maintain. Before Raines, Judge Greene's decision in 
Dellums ~plied the vote nullification standard from Kennedy v. 
Sampson in finding that the plaintiffs were injured in fact be-
cause of the threat that their right to vote for or against a decla-
ration of war would be lost. Judge Greene pointed out that this 
right must be confirmed by the court before the President acts, 
not afterward, in order to have any practical significance. Thus, 
there was a sufficient threatened injury to satisfy the standing 
41. Ange, 752 F. Supp. at 512; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962). 
42. 506 u.s. 224 (1993). 
43. 521 u.s. 811 (1997). 
44. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
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requirements. One practical lesson is that the judge's decision 
will depend on the factual setting. 
Once Raines is assigned, the analysis and the result may 
change. Raines is not a war powers case, but its strong disavowal 
of legislator standing in general and its requirement that legisla-
tors' votes be completely nullified by the President's action erect 
a significant obstacle to legislator standing. This barrier is made 
even more formidable by the Court's reliance on the fact that 
other legislative actions could still, in theory, be taken to provide 
a legislative remedy. After Raines, the Dellums group look 
more like dis~runtled losers in the political process than success-
ful plaintiffs.4 
For private citizen plaintiff Ange, Judge Lamberth found 
standing "to seek enforcement" of the War Powers Resolution, 
based on a determination that the Resolution permits a private 
right of action. Whether or not Judge Lamberth correctly ap-
plied the standard for private causes of action, he did not find 
that Ange had been injured in fact. 46 Student problem solvers 
should see that Ange's case presents a close call. Was his injury 
"actual or imminent," or "concrete and particularized?"47 The 
students should also see how, in the context of the problem, 
standing blends into the ripeness inquiry. 
Judge Greene determined that Dellums was not ripe for de-
cision because Congress, or a majority of Congress, had not been 
"heard from" and because the President had not committed 
himself to initiating war unilaterally. Thus, for Judge Greene, 
the constitutional impasse described by Justice Powell in Gold-
water v. Carter48 did not exist. The problem forces students to 
consider the ripeness aspect of the theory of justiciability and to 
assess the separation of powers reasons for and against the im-
passe standard. In addition, the problem may be used to return 
to the merits and to critique Judge Greene's analysis. It does not 
necessarily follow that because a majority is required to declare 
war, only a majority may seek a court order enjoining the Presi-
dent from initiating war. Logically, because the Constitution re-
45. This result was confirmed in the Kosovo litigation. See generally Campbell v. 
Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. C. T. 1999). 
46. After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), Judge Lamberth's 
analysis of standing would not be sustained. 
47. We also note for students that gadfly litigant Walter Pietsch's Gulf War suit 
against the President was dismissed on both citizen and taxpayer standing grounds. 
Pietsch v. Bush, 755 F. Supp. 62 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). 
48. 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (Powell, 1., concurring). 
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quires that Congress affirmatively declare war, a smaller number 
of Members (as few as fifty-one Senators, for example) could 
prevent the President from initiating war. Thus, that smaller 
number should be permitted to persuade a judge to enjoin the 
President. Put differently, the fact that a majority of Congress 
may have an incorrect opinion concerning the legality of the 
President going it alone against Iraq should not deny the court 
an opportunity to say whether the President must ask for 
authorization. The better ripeness argument on the facts of the 
problem and Dellums is that the executive branch had not yet 
committed itself to offensive war. 
Students will see that the impasse standard is prudential in 
nature, derived from separation of powers concerns. Logically, 
then, it is possible for the judges in this dispute to have found 
standing but not a ripe controversy, although practically the two 
inquiries blend together. Especially in light of Judge Lamberth's 
opinion that Ange would likely never be able to present a justi-
ciable controversy, it is fair to ask whether the ripeness and 
standing doctrines are merely convenient tools for avoiding diffi-
cult cases. 
Several objectives are served by combining the war powers 
and justiciability sections in our separation of powers unit in this 
way. First, we are able to develop fully the Article III law in the 
basic constitutional law course. We devote at least one class 
week to justiciability, and we spend ample time discussing both 
theory and practice issues. Instead of highly complex and ab-
stract concepts of legitimacy and textual commitment (political 
question doctrine), and the theoretical separation of merits from 
standing and ripeness, students learn how separation of powers 
purposes are furthered through selective enforcement of "do 
nothing" rules by judges in real legal disputes. 
Second, continuation of the Gulf War problem allows stu-
dents to see the relationship of the underlying merits to Article 
III, and to appreciate the importance of inquiries about justi-
ciability in a concrete setting. Third, the problem and cases 
force the students to understand theory. For example, parsing 
the Wechsler/Bickel debate about political questions,49 thinking 
through the Marbury50 judicial review doctrine's application, and 
49. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
Harv. L. Rev. 1, 7-9 (1959); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term Fore-
word: The Passive Virtues, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 40,75 (1961). 
50. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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applying the Baker v. Carr factors51 are essential ingredients in 
developing an answer to a motion to dismiss in Dellums. It has 
normally been our experience after teaching the separation of 
powers unit that the section on justiciability contributed more to 
the students' understanding of the separation of powers in con-
stitutional law than any of the more traditional separation topics 
within the canon. 
CONCLUSION 
As we considered changes for the fourth edition of our 
casebook, we decided that, other than updates, our objectives 
are being well served by the book as it is. Our book works well 
at teaching basic doctrine and theory and examines the integra-
tion of theory, doctrine, and practice. We agree with others, 
however, that greater attention should be given to constitutional 
law and practice in legislatures, executive offices, agencies, and 
local government institutions. As the canon evolves, we strive to 
complement our course with materials and discussion that will 
explore these topics as well as important developments in state 
constitutional law. 
51. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1 %2). 
